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Five more years of this: Introduction to a post 
election symposium 
  Frederick Harry Pitts 
Frederick Harry Pitts is an ESRC-funded PhD researcher in the Department of Social and Policy 
Sciences at the University of Bath, UK. His research explores work and work-time in the cultural and 
creative industries, with a specific focus on the struggle to measure, quantify and value creative labour. 
His approach is informed by a critical engagement with Marxian thought and critical theory, including 
Open Marxism, the German Neue Marx-Lektüre and Italian post-operaismo.
Alongside conventional academic journal articles, Tor 
will also feature written work in a range of other 
formats. These may be less scholarly in style, but no less 
scholarly in content. They may be shorter in length, but 
just as long on ideas. The journal particularly 
encourages current affairs opinion and commentary. 
The traditional gestation period of a thesis or a paper 
prevents timely response to moving issues. But Tor 
represents an excellent opportunity for scholars to 
apply their expertise to contemporary talking points as 
they happen.  
 
For this inaugural edition, the journal invited 
comment-style submissions addressing the most 
significant of recent events: the 2015 General Election. 
The resulting symposium of short reflections ruminates 
on the lay of the land post-election. The contributions 
each address a different aspect of the election and its 
aftermath. Some consider the performance of political 
parties. Others assess specific policy issues. Others still 
consider the global context of the next parliament. What 
unites them is that they prime the reader on what to 
expect in this most unexpected of new parliaments. 
Contributors include academics and graduate students 
from the three institutions of the South West Doctoral 
Training Centre: the University of Exeter, the University 
of Bath, and the University of Bristol. True to the 
interdisciplinary spirit of the DTC, contributors focus on 
areas relevant to their research interests. They bring 
subject-specific expertise to issues often elided or 
overlooked in the churn of the political news cycle. Not 
every aspect is covered. Of many big stories, the rise of 
the SNP and the success of the Conservatives receive no 
specific commentary. But the pieces discuss an array of 
issues, some well-covered since the election, and some 
that need further attention. To the well-covered, they 
add new scholarly perspectives. To the rest, they induct 
the reader into some crucial upcoming policy challenges. 
 
In this introduction, I will give a taster of what is to 
follow. I will draw links between the entries by 
wagering some additional observations and 
speculations about the election and the next five years. I 
will place specific focus on prospects for the UK left, 
where, in my opinion, interesting things could happen 
over the course of the next parliament. To a certain 
extent, my reflections will be limited to England. English 
politics is in flux, in a way that Scotland’s are not, for 
instance. Scotland has made a break with the political 
order. England might yet do the same. The situation, of 
course, is distinct in Wales and Northern Ireland. 
 
We open with three pieces reflecting on the 
performance and present prospects of three UK political 
parties: Labour, UKIP and the Liberal Democrats. In the 
first of these pieces, Lewis Coyne assays Labour’s loss 
and the options available to them as they seek to 
recover. Coyne casts a critical eye over the internal 
debate accompanying the post-Miliband leadership 
election. Party soul-searchers typically bemoan a failure 
to connect with one or another group of voters. For the 
left, the working class, lost to abstention in England and 
the SNP in Scotland. For the right, the middle, lost to the 
Tories in England. But, for Coyne, this conceals the need 
for Labour to recast itself as a movement dependent on 
no single base of support. 
 
Most accounts of Labour’s defeat emphasise voters 
rather than non-voters. One popular narrative is that 
Labour lost middle-class votes by appealing too little to 
‘aspiration’. Another is that votes leaked to the Tories 
because of a perceived lack of economic ‘credibility’. But 
one of the more persuasive arguments concerns those 
who did not vote rather than those who did. This has 
become known as the ‘lazy Labour’ explanation 
(Holehouse 2015). It not only explains Labour’s defeat, 
but the wildly inaccurate polling in the run up to the 
election. Polling overestimated Labour support because 
their historical, latent voter base told pollsters they 
would turn out on the day but ended up staying at home. 
Labour’s failure to connect with these voters lost them 
the election. This, we hear, is Ed Miliband’s preferred 
interpretation of his defeat (Eaton 2015).  
 
This resonates with the analysis given by Jon Trickett 
(2015). Trickett’s data suggests that Labour not only 
retained but improved their middle-class support. It 
was actually among working-class voters that Labour 
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leaked support. This gives the lie to the familiar 
argument that Labour was too left-wing and did not do 
enough to secure the votes of middle-class voters. 
Instead, Trickett’s data suggests, Labour insufficiently 
enthused poorer, working-class voters. They did not do 
enough to differentiate themselves from the other 
parties to represent a viable option for those in lowest 
economic bands. In England, these people did not turn 
out to vote. In Scotland, they turned out to vote for a 
party occupying a position on the populist left: the SNP. 
 
The next contribution communicates the importance 
of looking at non-voters as much as those who did vote. 
Voter turnout features prominently in Aurelien 
Mondon’s analysis of UKIP as an electoral phenomenon. 
Against the fulsome coverage presented in the UK media, 
Mondon paints a bleak picture for UKIP’s figurehead 
Nigel Farage. His party’s performance may seem 
significant percentage-wise. But when considered 
against overall voter turnout, it looks far less impressive. 
As Mondon notes, 33.9 per cent of registered voters 
abstained from voting on the day, not to mention those 
who did not register in the first place. This means that 
UKIP managed to secure fewer than one in ten of the 
available votes. This is despite optimum press coverage. 
Political debate skewed onto Farage’s favoured terrain 
whenever the UKIP leader appeared on television or 
radio. But support for UKIP’s ‘nativist’, ‘neo-racist’ right-
wing populism, Mondon suggests, is strikingly meagre. 
UKIP’s significance instead pertains to the effect 
wielded on political discourse through the media. 
Mondon contends that the party is a ‘decoy’ for 
politicians of other stripes to use as a means to shift 
political debate elsewhere. 
 
Mondon ends by recommending that the bubbling 
debate about the limits of political representation focus 
less on how well UKIP or any other party did or should 
have done. Rather, it should focus more on ‘the vast 
majority of the population who votes or does not vote'. 
Indeed, I would suggest that a focus on the latter could 
also help Labour understand the scale of their loss. It 
owes, perhaps, not to a failure to engage already-
enfranchised middle-class voters. Instead, it may owe to 
an inability to offer a convincing political reflection of 
reality for the disconnected, overworked and 
underemployed. In Scotland, a party managed to do this 
to a much greater extent, annihilating Labour in the 
process. But what happened North of the border does 
not tell the whole story. Labour lost in England, too. 
 
In the third contribution, Rebecca Tidy gives an 
insight into Liberal Democrat election strategy. She 
considers where it erred, and how the party recovers. 
Tidy emphasises the Lib Dems’ previous success 
running candidates with strong records of local 
campaigning. She recommends that selection 
procedures return to sourcing candidates with 
established constituency backgrounds. This, she 
contends, will get the Lib Dems back on track. 
 
But can the Lib Dems recover through a local strategy 
votes lost through national complicity in a coalition 
abhorred by many of their potential supporters? Tidy 
suggests that, by playing to their traditional localised 
strengths, the party can recover. But one feels their best 
bet may be to wait for a future realignment of the 
centre-left in the event of Labour’s implosion. Some, 
such as Jon Cruddas, suggest that Labour may not exist 
within a year, rendered extinct by a Spain-style surge of 
the radical left (Holehouse and Knapton 2015). Others 
contend that Labour has ‘outlived its usefulness’ (Todd 
2015). Belonging to another time, it may be ‘Pasokified’ 
(Doran 2015), just as the social democrats were in 
Greece. Its end may unfold in any number of ways. The 
fragile balance of its internal contradictions may be lost 
if either left or right exert too great a pull after the 
leadership election. If Liz Kendall heads up a Blairite 
resurgence, the unions could finally take their 
substantial heft elsewhere to forge a new political party 
of the left. If, by some miracle, the non-aligned left join 
Labour en masse and vote Jeremy Corbyn in as leader, 
the Progress faction will leave and form a new SDP. One 
could plausibly imagine the Lib Dems assimilating into 
the latter post-Labour rump.  
 
But there may be a role for the Lib Dems in an 
altogether rosier outcome. Pressure group Compass 
propose a ‘progressive’ electoral pact motivated by the 
pursuit of proportional representation (2015). The pact, 
supporters suggest, would witness a cessation of 
hostilities between Labour, the Greens and the Lib Dems 
in England for the next election. It would even extend to 
giving SNP candidates a free run in Scotland, and, 
presumably, Plaid Cymru in Wales. They would 
campaign on a platform of PR, from which all would 
benefit, and upon which Labour may depend for its 
survival (Bastani 2015, Hind 2015).  
 
The trouble with such putative pacts is the pitch. They 
are phrased in terms of ‘progressiveness’. But 
‘progressive’ is a largely meaningless term imported 
from the different political context of the United States. 
For many, progress is less of a selling point than 
standstill. Some want to roll things back, not push them 
forwards. Why propel the world further and faster on its 
present trajectory, when we can stop it and get off? On 
both the left and the right, Green and UKIP, voters are 
circumspect about hurtling forwards into a false 
gleaming future. For the first, environmental collapse 
awaits. For the latter, untrammelled immigration and 
the European super-state. Any ‘progressive’ political 
pact must contend with these conservative realities. 
And this is not only about the right. A left 
conservativism is something considered, albeit in a 
foreshortened way, by the ‘Blue Labour’ faction of 
Cruddas, Maurice Glasman et al (Mardell 2015). The left 
will spend a lot of time defending things under attack 
from the forces of capital in the next five years. Further 
‘progress’ along the lines implied in the epithet 
‘progressive’ will be the last thing on their minds. We 
have lived with capitalist ‘progress’ for some time now, 
sadly. And some, unsurprisingly, want to escape. 
 
The aforementioned eventualities may sound 
unlikely- splits, new parties, pacts. But the only thing 
predictable about the next five years is their 
unpredictability. The EU referendum and the attendant 
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prospect of second Scottish Indyref in the event of 
Brexit add a layer of overarching political uncertainty. 
Cameron faces trouble keeping unruly ministers loyal to 
whichever party line the PM takes on Europe (Watt and 
Wintour 2015). Complicating matters further, Cameron 
plans to step down ahead of the next election.  But more 
unpredictable still is how people react to another five 
years of cuts to welfare, reforms to employee 
protections and attacks on working conditions. There 
are plenty of big stories to come in the formal sphere of 
parliamentary politics. But the politics of the street, the 
staffroom and the picket line promise to be as 
significant. The Tory party and its traditional class 
constituency are emboldened by the promise of 
shredded red tape and restrictions on union freedoms. 
On the other side, the first two weeks of the new 
government provoked renewed street protests. These 
will only intensify as the new government picks fights 
over where the axe falls next. Resistance may coalesce 
around an identifiable electoral project. This would be 
in line with the ‘electoral turn’ witnessed elsewhere on 
the European left (Milburn 2015). The decision of some 
on the radical left to throw their lot in with the Green 
Party (Ollie V, 2015) could be a harbinger of things to 
come. 
 
Could Labour’s rightward shift catalyse a divorce 
within its ranks (Chessum 2015)? Might we see a new 
party funded by trade unions and composed initially of 
what is now the parliamentary Labour left? The 
numbers of the latter swelled with the 2015 intake, 
which is far more leftish than the last. Moreover, the flux 
in which Labour finds itself makes such possibilities 
perfectly discernible.  
 
Scotland has a successful and populist left electoral 
force, in the shape of the SNP. It also has a grassroots 
social movement sprung from the energy of the Radical 
Independence Campaign. In the absence of any formal 
electoral movement of the left in England, the next five 
years may witness the building of grassroots 
alternatives. These may politicise social relations 
(Bonefeld 2014) rather than enter politics directly. They 
could circulate around food, housing, culture and 
relationships, and find ways to meet the need for them 
outside capitalist social forms. The rise of Syriza in 
Greece relied in part on the development of an 
alternative solidarity economy of foodbanks, for 
instance (Mason 2015a). Extended to our different, less 
desperate context, such innovations would not only 
respond to poverty and the retreat of the welfare state. 
They would also support new ways of living and relating 
to each other. Instead of addressing themselves to the 
seizure of state power, they would build an existence 
outside the nexus of commodities, money and labour. 
The next parliament will push a renewed programme of 
austerity and cuts. Those subject are presently deprived, 
in England at least, of an authentic party-political 
representation of the desire for any alternative to the 
present state of things. It will be interesting to see 
whether prefigurative projects will spring up over the 
next few years that address both the material and 
political impasse. 
 
Government support is receding ever further. Projects 
like, say, ‘communist foodbanks’, may step in. They 
would turn, in an unsanctioned way, the government's 
own abandoned big society against them.  The next 
contribution to the symposium concerns the role of 
foodbanks in the ‘new welfare settlement’ of Tory rule. 
In it, Rana Jawad suggests that cuts in welfare 
provision demand new approaches to poverty 
alleviation. The work of faith and charitable groups in 
setting up and running foodbanks has provided a much-
needed source of support to those left behind by a 
lopsided labour market. Foodbanks may be auspiciously 
an ‘emergency measure’ forged in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis. But Jawad suggests that they are ‘the 
best kept secret of British Social Policy’.  
 
Jawad suggests that, in the UK, as many as one million 
people use foodbanks. Thus far, foodbanks have taken a 
strictly faith-based or charitable complexion in the UK. 
But, reading Jawad’s piece prompts thoughts of new 
agendas. What further developments in this area might 
accompany the continued retrenchment of the welfare 
state under the new government? Could resistance to 
austerity come to resemble to same politicisation of 
everyday life attempted by Syriza in the far more acute 
Greek scenario? Bristol, home of the SWDTC, possesses 
many examples of an alternative economic 
infrastructure: food co-ops, a local currency, freeshops 
and shareshops, community supported agriculture and 
cafes serving free meals sourced from supermarket food 
waste. What new dimensions might all this assume in 
the next five years? Bristol witnessed a huge Green 
surge at the election. In Bristol one sees a possible basis 
for a politics unrestricted by the formal political realm 
of rhetoric, electioneering and policymaking. Rather, its 
purchase is on the ground. The strength of the Green 
Party suggests that Bristol’s projects and movements 
may have found at least some existing electoral 
expression. Indeed, in London, Sian Berry, a Green 
candidate for the mayoral nomination, has promised 
‘bring the energy’ of campaigns and movements ‘into 
City Hall’ (2015). Her role would be to channel in the 
formal political sphere the extra-parliamentary 
demands of movements embedded in everyday life. This 
indicates a potential combination of street politics, 
practical alternatives of cooperation and mutual aid, 
and a left 'electoral turn'. This potent mix will be worth 
a keenly kept eye in years to come.  
 
The Green election campaign, exemplified in Bristol, 
held sway best as an expression of local sentiment 
rather than as a national programme for change. This 
perhaps owes to the poor performance of the party’s 
leader, Natalie Bennett, on the national stage. The 
Greens performed well in Bristol, and achieved their 
best result in a UK election. But, nationally, the party 
acted as a vector of concerns quite apart from its 
founding purpose. Instead of the environment, the 
terrain upon which it fought concerned economic 
injustice and immigration. Indeed, the environment 
hardly featured in the electoral campaigns of any major 
party, the Greens included. The short-termist outlook of 
UK politics suggests that the environment will continue 
to be one of several elephants in the room.  
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Post-election, Cameron assigned the environment 
brief to a rare Tory climate change ‘believer’, Amber 
Rudd (see Carrington 2015). Meanwhile, he is beholden 
by virtue of his small majority to the sceptical right of 
his party. This suggests that green issues are by no 
means beyond political contention in this parliament. In 
the next contribution, Nick Kirsop-Taylor surveys the 
future of biodiversity offsetting. It illustrates how 
Cameron’s pledge to be the ‘greenest government ever’ 
has collided with the reality of cuts to the Defra budget. 
Biodiversity offsetting is a mechanism whereby the 
environmental costs of building and development are 
repaid through new green initiatives elsewhere. 
Theoretically, when one tree falls, another is planted 
somewhere else. But, Kirsop-Taylor suggests, this policy 
is unlikely to survive the next parliament other than as a 
seldom-seen clause buried in planning rules. 
 
Whatever comes of it, biodiversity offsetting is 
revealing of at least one government foible of both the 
last five years and the next. To tally up the cost of what 
is lost and how much is needed to replace it, the natural 
world must be measured and given a value. What should 
rightly escape the sphere of economic calculation is 
made subservient to it. As a 2014 Financial Times article 
on the topic attests (Wilson 2014), it is not always easy 
to establish a clear measure of value for flora and fauna, 
birds and bees. With difficulty, the violence of 
quantitative abstraction is wrought upon the wilderness. 
It acquires a monetary value, and becomes 
commensurate with other things in the world of 
commodities. It can then be traded, bought and sold. It is 
no accident that these policy proposals have coincided 
with recent, unsuccessful attempts to sell off Britain’s 
forests (BBC 2013). 
 
This same process occurs elsewhere in Tory reforms 
commenced in 2010. This is especially the case where 
they pertain to that which was formerly public shifting 
into private hands. Nowhere more so is this dialectic of 
measurement, privatisation and commodification in 
evidence than in education. In the next contribution, 
Anna Edwards assesses the ongoing ‘quasi-
marketisation’ of secondary education. The transferring 
of public assets into private hands via academisation 
depends upon systems of measurement. They are akin 
to that practiced in the process of biodiversity offsetting. 
As Edwards notes, ‘a market-based approach to the 
delivery of education […] rests upon the assumption 
that we can accurately measure and compare school 
performance and educational standards'. Edwards 
suggests neither the Conservatives or Labour question 
the ‘philosophical’ viability of this measurement. It falls, 
then, to others to question the measures and valuations 
made.  
 
On the one hand, the main political parties appeal to 
the good of the economy as an abstract, external force 
for which we are compelled to do our best. But, on the 
other hand, evidence of contestation is everywhere, 
when one looks for it. ‘Value struggles’ (Frenzel and 
Beverungen 2014) contest governmental or capitalist 
understandings of what something is ‘worth’. They are 
surprisingly commonplace in the UK, despite being 
rarely thought of as such. These struggles typically 
concern a few recurring themes. A resource facing cuts 
or privatization. The imposition of something lucrative 
to its owners but of little use to anyone else. The 
eradication or exploitation of heritage or green space. 
Many examples spring to mind. Grassroots campaigns to 
save local NHS services. Anti-fracking movements. Local 
groups fighting chain stores, supermarkets and big-
name coffee shops dominating their high streets. These 
all pitch different visions of worth that undermine blind 
subservience to the ‘economy’. They challenge the 
narrow quantitative understanding of value that the 
'economy' implies. As the new Tory majority pursues an 
agenda of privatisation and marketization, expect these 
value struggles to intensify. Higher education may be a 
flashpoint, with staff and students foremost in fighting 
these struggles (Morgan 2015). There are few sectors 
with as much at stake from measurement, monitoring, 
commercialisation and privatisation. 
 
In the next contribution, Donna Clutterbuck 
discusses the new government's approach to domestic 
violence. Clutterbuck highlights the contradictions of 
Tory policy. These contradictions are between not only 
words and actions, but within individual pieces of 
legislation. For instance, domestic violence legislation 
now males provision for instances of coercive control. 
But this legislation does not specifically address gender. 
This absence is stark in light of statistical evidence 
showing that women are overwhelmingly more likely to 
be victims of domestic violence of all kinds. Further, 
funding cuts have severely inhibited the ability of 
support services to cope with demand. What is more, 
cuts to legal aid prevent women subject to domestic 
violence from seeking and gaining justice. Promised cuts 
to public spending, Clutterbuck writes, will further 
undermine Cameron's professed commitment to tackle 
violence against women.  
 
The final two contributions turn to events outside the 
UK. In the penultimate piece, Bruce Morley highlights 
how the fortunes of the UK economy may have less to do 
with government policy than with the health and 
survival of the Euro. Morley begins by giving an 
overview of the history and present predicament of the 
Eurozone. He suggests that the UK could benefit from a 
fall in the strength of the pound ‘in sympathy with the 
Euro’. This would increase exports and thus GDP. But, 
should the serious problems faced by the Euro explore, 
the UK will be badly burnt.  
 
In that event, it will be interesting to see to whom 
Cameron and Osborne apportion blame for any decline 
in the British economy. They were elected in 2010 by 
holding Labour personally culpable for a global 
economic crash. They were re-elected in 2015 by 
claiming personal responsibility for the recovery. So far, 
so consistent. But if they endure either European or 
global instability at some time in the next parliament, 
personal responsibility will be a hot potato they will be 
loath to keep hold of. On one side of the green benches 
at least, the explanatory burden is sure to fall anywhere 
but upon the budgetary red box. 
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In the final contribution to the symposium, Biao 
Zhang considers the future prospects for the UK’s 
relationship with China. Zhang describes how, in the last 
parliament, Cameron moved the UK much closer to 
China. Interestingly, Zhang situates this move in the 
context of Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United 
States. The UK is a minor partner in relations with both 
the US and China, and will, Zhang suggests, choose 
between the two big powers in shifting ways that 
address specific needs: economic, political, military. One 
gets the impression of the UK as a silent, supine second-
rater desperate to court others but always waiting on a 
call.  
 
This brings to light a feature of this election and likely 
many more hence. The two main parties do not wish to 
discuss the big challenges and issues of the next decades 
(see Mason 2015b for an example). One is the growing 
irrelevance of the UK as a global player, forced to 
negotiate in the gaps between the tectonic plates of 
world power in East and West. A second relates also to 
the rise of China as an economic powerhouse, and it is 
with this aspect that I will end. The world of 
employment has changed in the UK. As manufacturing 
has gone East, so have the jobs associated with it and 
the lifestyles they implied. In a flexibilised low-skill 
service economy, unemployment and underemployment 
are permanent. They are unsolvable short of a 
restructuring and redistribution of working hours- a 
prospect far-fetched in the present system. Automation 
is a major possibility given nary a mention by any 
leading politician. It promises to make redundant the 
remaining few in possession of a full-time secure job 
(Frey and Osborne 2013, Lanchester 2015). In a society 
ill-prepared to countenance, let alone support, life 
without work, this represents an impending social 
disaster. Politicians compete with one another to 
penalise those who do not work or cannot find one of 
the few jobs available to the many forced to need them. 
Life is made intolerable without employment in a 
society that does not afford employment for all in the 
first place. More welfare cuts are to come. The 
imposition of workfare continues. Thus, the material 
conditions to be safe, secure, happy and fed will depend 
upon one’s capacity to work for the foreseeable future. 
But the basis for this is rapidly eroding, and no 
politician will publicly note it. Sold on the lie that the 
system is here to stay, those subject to a society of work 
on the wane will only suffer. The next five years may not 
witness any confession or acknowledgement of it. But a 
social crisis is unfolding that will define the 
development of new political projects over the course of 
the next parliament. We have five years more of this- of 
further austerity, cuts to welfare and worsening 
precariousness. The party that best plugs into this 
prospectus stands to profit. Whether that party 
currently exists remains to be seen. An English Podemos 
may yet appear. Five more years may be a long time 
indeed. 
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Labour’s defeat on the 7th of May was remarkable in its 
scale and speed. The widespread incredulity which 
greeted the 10pm exit poll swiftly gave way to 
resignation as it transpired that not only had Labour 
been all but wiped out – as expected – by the SNP in 
Scotland, but they had made almost no headway against 
the Conservatives in England and Wales. Although in the 
history of the party there have technically been greater 
defeats (in 1931 and 1983), Labour has arguably never 
been in a more perilous situation. Worse, few Labour 
politicians or sympathetic commentators appear to 
recognise this, and consequently their strategic 
prescriptions merely risk compounding the problem.  
Essential to Labour’s defeat is the opinion polling 
debacle. In 2012 Labour appeared to open a sizable lead 
in the polls. This was attributed to three factors: the 
conversion of 2010 Liberal Democrat voters to Labour, 
the rise of UKIP initially at the expense of the 
Conservatives, and the standard ‘swing voters’ moving 
between the Tories and Labour. This formed the basis of 
a strategy to secure a mere 35% of the vote, proven to 
be sufficient for a majority government by the 2005 
victory. Labour’s lead gradually fell over the course of 
three years to an election-day tie with the Conservatives 
at 34%, apparently leaving Labour with every chance of 
forming the next government. The flaw in the plan, 
however, was that the polls were systematically 
overstating Labour support, and thus the strategy was 
built on sand. 
 
The cause of this consistent inaccuracy is currently the 
subject of an enquiry by the British Polling Council, but 
post-election research provides sufficient evidence for 
an analysis of the final result. According to some, the 
reason Labour lost is that they were too left-wing: as a 
result of their narrow strategy, Labour failed to occupy 
the political centre ground and speak to the aspirations 
of middle England. Within the party, Tony Blair and 
Peter Mandelson, amongst others, point to Labour’s loss 
of key marginal seats in England as proof that the 
country defaulted to the Conservatives for the above 
reasons.  
 
Others, such as Owen Jones and Len McCluskey, have 
noted in response note that Labour’s wholesale collapse 
in Scotland to a party that positioned itself to Labour’s 
left is at odds with the Blair-Mandelson analysis. It is 
argued that in the eyes of the Scottish electorate Labour 
was too right-wing, and this was the decisive factor. All 
agree, however, that instrumental in Labour’s defeat 
was the public perception of economic incompetence, a 
result of the leadership’s failure to rebut the colossal 
falsehood that the 2007 global financial crisis was 
caused by Gordon Brown spending money on schools 
and hospitals.  
 
Both assessments are partially correct insofar as they 
identify an aspect of the defeat. However, both miss the 
fact that Labour’s loss was actually three-fold. Firstly, 
Labour lost left-wing voters and all but one seat in 
Scotland to the SNP. Secondly, Labour lost moderate 
voters in England and Wales to the Conservatives, losing 
the marginal seats. And finally, Labour lost working-
class voters to UKIP across the country, but particularly 
